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1 Introduction
Whether financial development (which relaxes financial constraints) amplifies the effect
of sunspot variables has not been fully investigated in economic theory. In this paper, by
applying a dynamic general equilibrium model with two production sectors, we demon-
strate that financial development can magnify self-fulfilling business fluctuations caused
by sunspot variables.
Over the past twenty years, many researchers have paid attention to indeterminacy
of equilibria in dynamic general equilibrium models (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1994,
1996; Boldrin and Rustichini, 1994; Benhabib et al., 2000; Nishimura and Venditti;
2004, 2007; Dufourt et al., 2015). Sunspots are defined as extrinsic random variables
that may impact agents’ expectations without directly affecting economic fundamentals
(Shell, 1977; Azariadis, 1981; Cass and Shell, 1983). It is widely known that when inde-
terminacy arises, extrinsic uncertainty randomizes multiple equilibria and endogenous
business fluctuations can occur. In this literature, production externalities have been
one of the important features of the model, as they are a source of inefficiency that
causes indeterminacy. Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), for instance, prove that indeter-
minacy can occur in a dynamic general equilibrium model with two production sectors
even when production externalities are very small.
In the current paper, to explore whether financial development amplifies the effect
of sunspots, financial frictions are explicitly introduced in the discrete-time version of
Benhabib and Nishimura’s model, in which consumption goods are produced in the
first sector and intermediate goods are produced in the second sector. In our model,
agents receive an idiosyncratic productivity shock in each period when producing capital
goods. Those who have higher productivity purchase intermediate goods and initiate
an investment project to produce capital goods. They face financial constraints and can
borrow only up to a certain proportion of their savings when initiating an investment
project. Meanwhile, those who have lower productivity lend their all savings in the
financial market. Therefore, borrowers and lenders endogenously appear in equilibrium.
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In our model, the extent of financial constraints measures the extent of financial
development, following the literature (e.g., Aghion and Banerjee, 2005). In equilibrium,
whereas capital accumulation is promoted and the gross product in the steady state
monotonically increases as the financial sector becomes better developed, indeterminacy
of equilibria is more likely to occur if the consumption sector is more labor intensive
from the social perspective but less labor intensive from the private perspective relative
to the intermediate sector. Given these results, we introduce a sunspot variable in
the model and examine whether financial development amplifies or contracts sunspot
fluctuations. Our findings are as follows. Under high labor intensity in the consumption
good sector from the social perspective, financial development is more likely to magnify
sunspot fluctuations, whereas under high labor intensity in the intermediate good sector
from the social perspective, financial development is more likely to contract sunspot
fluctuations.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the model
in which there are two production sectors in the economy, with each sector subject to
sector-specific production externalities, and in which infinitely lived agents face financial
constraints. In section 3, equilibrium in the model is derived. We also characterize a
steady state of the dynamical system in this section. In section 4, the dynamic prop-
erty in the neighborhood of the steady state is investigated, and the condition for the
economy to exhibit indeterminacy of equilibria is obtained. In section 5, we introduce
a sunspot variable in the model and explore whether financial development amplifies
sunspot fluctuations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a closed economy that consists of an infinitely lived representative firm and a
continuum of infinitely lived agents with the total population normalized to one. The
economy goes in discrete time indexed by t from t = 0 to t = +∞. The representa-
tive firm produces both consumption and intermediate goods with different technologies
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in each period. The intermediate goods are assumed to be numeraire throughout the
analysis. The infinitely lived agents are potential capital producers but receive unin-
sured idiosyncratic productivity shocks in each period that affect productivity in capital
production.
2.1 Agents
2.1.1 Timing of events
At the beginning of period t, an agent earns incomes: a wage income, returns to her sav-
ings, and a lump-sum profit from the representative firm. The market for consumption
goods in period t opens at the beginning of the period and is closed before an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock in period t is realized. Accordingly, the agent must make a
decision about consumption and savings at the beginning of period t without knowing
her productivity in capital production. At the end of period t, the agent receives an
idiosyncratic productivity shock. The agent can adopt two saving methods: lending her
savings in the financial market or initiating an investment project. The agent chooses
one of the saving methods with knowing her productivity. Lending one unit of savings
in period t yields a claim to rt+1 units of intermediate goods in period t + 1, where
rt+1 is the gross real interest rate, whereas purchasing one unit of intermediate goods in
period t for the investment project creates Φt units of capital used at time t + 1. One
unit of capital is sold at price qt+1 to the production sector in period t + 1. Capital
is perishable in one period. Although the agent can borrow in the financial market,
she faces a financial constraint, which implies that she can only borrow up to a certain
proportion of her savings.
Φt is the productivity shock on the probability space (Ω,F , P ), where Ω is a sample
space, F is a σ−algebra on Ω, and P is the probability measure.1 Φt is a function
of ωt ∈ Ω, the support for which is given by [0, η] where η ∈ (0,∞). The cumulative
distribution function of Φt is given by G(Φ) := P ({ωt ∈ Ω | Φt(ωt) ≤ Φ}), where
1One can assume Ω = [0, 1].
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{ωt ∈ Ω | Φt(ωt) ≤ Φ} ∈ F . G(Φ) is continuously differentiable on the support and time-
invariant. Φ0,Φ1, · · · , are independent and identically distributed across both agents
and time (the i.i.d. assumption). Because there is no insurance market for productivity
shocks, no one can insure against low productivity. Define the history of ωt as ω
t−1 =
{ω0, ω1, ..., ωt−1}. Then, we obtain the probability space (Ωt,F t, P t), which is a Cartesian
product of t copies of (Ω,F , P ) in which ωt−1 is an element of Ωt. An individual who
experiences this history can be identified by ωt−1.
2.1.2 Utility maximization










where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and cτ (ωτ−1) is consumption. E[.|ωt−1]
is an expectation operator given the history ωt−1. The agent in period t maximizes her
lifetime utility subject to
pτcτ (ω
τ−1) + xτ (ω




τ−1) + wτ + πτ (1)
bτ (ω
τ ) ≥ −λaτ (ωτ−1) (2)
xτ (ω
τ ) ≥ 0 (3)
for τ ≥ t. In (1), wτ is a wage income, πτ is a profit obtained from the production
sector, and pτ is the price of consumption goods. Additionally, xt(ω
t) is an interme-
diate good used for an investment project, and bτ (ω
t) is lending if bτ (ω
t) > 0 and
borrowing if bτ (ω
t) < 0. For capital production, a linear technology is assumed such as
Φτ−1(ωτ−1)xτ−1(ω
τ−1), which is capital produced in period τ by an agent who initiates a
project in period τ−1 drawing productivity Φτ−1. In any case, at(ωt−1) := xt(ωt)+bτ (ωt)
is the agent’s savings in period t. When the agent makes a decision about consump-
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tion, ct(ω
t−1), and saving, at(ω
t−1), in period t, she does not know her productivity




t), the agent knows Φt(ωt) when she makes a portfo-
lio decision about investing in a project, lending, and/or borrowing in period t. Eq.
(1) is effective for τ ≥ 1. It is assumed that the flow budget constraint is given by
a0 = q0X0 + w0 + π0 − p0c0 in period 0, where X0 is the initial capital endowment that
is commonly distributed across agents.
The agent faces a financial constraint given by inequality (2).2 Inequality (2) implies
that an agent can borrow in the financial market only up to a certain proportion of her
savings, which is also regarded as her net worth. λ ∈ (0,∞) measures the extent of
financial constraints; i.e., the financial constraint is more relaxed as λ becomes greater.
Inequality (2) is converted into bτ (ω
τ ) ≥ −µxτ (ωτ ), where µ = λ/(1 + λ) ∈ (0, 1).
This constraint is more convenient than inequality (2), and we use it henceforth. The
financial market approaches perfection as µ goes to 1. As in the literature, µ is assumed
to measure the degree of financial development.3 Finally, we impose a nonnegativity
constraint given by inequality (3) on the purchase of intermediate goods.
2.1.3 Optimal decision within a period
We define a new variable as ϕt := rt+1/qt+1. Agents know the productivity shocks for
capital production realized in period t when they make an optimal portfolio decision
about investment, lending, and borrowing in the same period. Therefore, an agent
who receives Φt > ϕt borrows up to the limit of the financial constraint and purchases
intermediate goods to start an investment project, whereas an agent who receives Φt ≤ ϕt
lends all her savings in the financial market and obtains interest of rt+1.
4 One notes that
ϕt is the cutoff for the productivity shocks that divide agents into lenders and borrowers
2Many researchers assume this type of financial constraint in the literature. See, for instance, Aghion
et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005), Aghion et al. (2005), and Kunieda and Shibata (2016).
3See, for instance, Aghion and Banerjee (2005).
4Agents who receive Φt = ϕt are indifferent between initiating a project and lending in the financial
market. We assume they lend their savings in the financial market.
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in period t, and the agent’s optimal decision within a period is given by
xt(ω
t) =
 0 if Φt(ωt) ≤ ϕtat(ωt−1)






t−1) if Φt(ωt) ≤ ϕt
− µ
1−µat(ω
t−1) if Φt(ωt) > ϕt.
(5)
From the portfolio decision given by (4) and (5), the flow budget constraint (1) is
rewritten as
aτ (ω
τ−1) + pτcτ (ω
τ−1) = Rτ (ωτ−1)aτ−1(ω
τ−2) + wτ + πτ , (6)
where Rτ (ωτ−1) := max{rτ , (qτΦτ−1(ωτ−1) − rτµ)/(1 − µ)}. The maximization of the






The necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the lifetime utility maximization
problem are given by the Euler equation (7) as well as the transversality condition
limτ→∞ δ
τE[at+τ (ω
t+τ−1)/pt+τ |ωt−1] = 0.
2.2 Production
The representative firm uses the following two Cobb-Douglas production technologies:












β1 , 0 < a1, b1, α1, β1 < 1
for intermediate goods, and












β2 , 0 < a2, b2, α2, β2 < 1
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for consumption goods, where ai + αi + bi + βi = 1 and ai + bi =: e ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2.
In the production technologies, lit and z
i
t are labor and capital inputs, respectively. The
components of production externalities with respect to labor and capital are given by l̄it
and k̄it, respectively. Note that both labor and capital exhibit positive externalities to





exogenous when the firm solves the profit maximization problem, it holds that lit = l̄
i
t
and kit = k̄
i
t in equilibrium.























t )− qtzt − wtlt, (8)








t is the population of agents.
It is assumed that lt is constant and normalized to lt = 1. The first-order conditions for












































t =: q(pt), (14)













One may say that if a1/b1 < a2/b2 ⇐⇒ a1/(e − a1) < a2(e − a2) ⇐⇒ a1 < a2, the
consumption good sector is labor intensive relative to the intermediate good sector from
the private perspective and if θ1/(1 − θ1) < θ2/(1 − θ2) ⇐⇒ θ1 < θ2, the consumption
good sector is labor intensive relative to the intermediate good sector from the social
perspective.
3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is given by sequences of prices {wt, qt, pt, rt+1} for all t ≥ 0
and allocation {ct(ωt−1), at(ωt−1), kt(ωt), bt(ωt)} for all t ≥ 0 and ωt, and {zt, lt} for all
t ≥ 0, so that (i) for each ωt, the consumer maximizes her lifetime utility from time t
onward, (ii) the representative firm maximizes its profits in each period, and (iii) the
consumption and intermediate good markets, the financial market, the capital market,
and the labor market clear.5
3.1 Market clearing conditions
In each period, aggregate consumption is equal to the production of consumption goods,





t−1)dP t(ωt−1) = F 2(z2t , l
2
t ), (15)
where F 2(z2t , l
2







t ). Eq. (4) implies that the intermediate goods are
purchased by agents who draw higher productivity such that Φt(ωt) > ϕt. Accordingly,
5To be precise, ω−1 is empty because c0 is not subject to any history of the stochastic events.
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t)dP t+1(ωt) = F 1(z1t , l
1
t ), (16)
where Ξt = {ωt ∈ Ω|Φt(ωt) ≤ ϕt} and F 1(z1t , l1t ) = F̄ 1(l1t , z1t , l1t , z1t ). In the financial




t)dP t+1(ωt) = 0. (17)
Capital is produced by agents who draw higher productivity such that Φt(ωt) > ϕt as
seen in (4) and used by the representative firm. Then, we have the capital market








Finally, the labor market clearing condition is given by
l1t + l
2
t = 1. (19)
3.2 Gross product in equilibrium
From (11), (12), (19), and z1t + z
2
t = zt, the production functions are expressed by














Eqs. (20) and (21) rewrite the gross product, Yt = F
1(l1t , z
1
t ) + ptF
2(l2t , z
2







The financial market clearing condition (17) determines ϕt in equilibrium as shown in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The cutoff, ϕt, is given by
G(ϕt) = µ. (23)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Since the cumulative distribution function is strictly increasing over the support,
ϕt is uniquely determined as ϕt = G
−1(µ) =: ϕ∗ and increases as µ increases. This
relationship between ϕ∗ and µ implies that as the financial constraint is relaxed, the
number of lenders increases and the number of capital producers (borrowers) decreases.
As the number of capital producers decreases, inefficiency regarding the allocation of
intermediate goods is corrected because the intermediate goods are intensively used by
higher-productivity agents when ϕ∗ increases.
3.4 Dynamical system





t−2)dP t(ωt−1) = q(pt)zt. (24)
Proof: See the Appendix.
One notes from Lemma 1 that the total income from all agents’ savings is eventually
equal to the value of total capital in the economy. By using Lemma 1, we aggregate
the flow budget constraint (6) across all agents and obtain the relationship between the





t−1)dP t(ωt−1) = F 1(l1t , z
1
t ) (25)
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intermediate goods are used to produce capital by the higher-productivity agents,
i.e., those who draw Φt(ωt) greater than ϕt, and thus, the i.i.d. assumption, Lemma 2,












Proof: See the Appendix.









From Eqs. (22) and (27), we have
Yt+1 = −
H(ϕ∗)q(pt+1)
e(1− µ)(a1 − a2)




The expected return, E[Rt+1(ωt)|ωt−1], can be computed by using G(ϕ∗) = µ and






Proof: See the Appendix.









θ2 =: s(pt). (30)
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3.5 Steady state









It follows from Eqs. (13), (14), (27), and (31) that the capital stock, z̄, in the steady










a2 + δe(a1 − a2)
. (32)
Eqs. (13), (14), (28), and (31) yield the gross product, Ȳ , in the steady state as follows:
Ȳ = Ψ
(
1 + δ(a1 − a2)







The extent of financial market imperfections measured by µ affects the price of con-
sumption goods, capital accumulation, and the gross product in the steady state as
demonstrated in Proposition 4 below.6
Proposition 4. As the financial constraint is relaxed, the following hold:
• If the production of the intermediate goods is more labor (capital) intensive than
that of the consumption goods from the social perspective, i.e., θ1 > θ2 (θ1 < θ2)
from the social perspective, the price of consumption goods in the steady state
decreases (increases), i.e., ∂p̄/∂µ < 0 (∂p̄/∂µ > 0).
• The capital stock in the steady state increases, i.e., ∂z̄/∂µ > 0.
• The gross product in the steady state increases, i.e., ∂Ȳ /∂µ > 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
6Throughout the analysis, we exclusively focus on the case of imperfect specialization in which the
economy consistently produces both intermediate and consumption goods. One can show that the
steady state that we have derived exists in the area of imperfect specialization. By continuity, both
intermediate and consumption goods are produced in the neighborhood of the steady state.
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We can intuitively understand the results of Proposition 4. As the financial constraint
is relaxed, allocative efficiency with regard to the use of intermediate goods is corrected.
As the financial constraint is relaxed, less productive agents are excluded from capital
production activities, and capital producers who draw higher productivity use more
intermediate goods. Then, aggregate productivity regarding capital production in the
economy becomes higher. Accordingly, total production of capital in the steady state,
z̄, increases. Capital and labor are complementary in production in both production
sectors. Therefore, it is straightforward to show that if z̄ increases, the capital price
decreases because the marginal product of capital decreases, whereas the wage rate
increases because the marginal product of labor increases. If the capital price decreases
and the wage rate increases, the relative price of final goods in the labor-intensive sector
increases, and the relative price of final goods in the capital-intensive sector decreases.
This means that the price of consumption goods, p̄, decreases (increases) as µ increases
if θ1 > θ2 (θ1 < θ2). This reverse Stolper-Samuelson property helps us understand the
effect that the relaxation of the financial constraint has on the price of consumption
goods, p̄, in the steady state.7
4 Local dynamics
By inserting Eq. (30) into (28), we obtain a dynamical system in this economy with
respect to Yt and pt as follows:










7Note that the causality from the prices of input goods to the prices of final goods is opposite to that
of the standard Stolper-Samuelson theorem, in which the prices of final goods affect the prices of input
goods. In a closed economy without any aggregate shocks, the prices of input goods are determined by
the extant capital and labor together with technologies, and thus, the prices of input goods affect the
prices of final goods.
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where
J(Yt, pt) = −
H(ϕ∗)q(s(pt))
e(1− µ)(a1 − a2)




The linearization of the dynamical system (34) around the steady state yields
 Yt+1 − Ȳ
pt+1 − p̄
 =




 Yt − Ȳ
pt − p̄
 , (35)
where Jp(Y, p) := ∂J(Y, p)/∂p. From Eq. (35), we obtain the eigenvalues, κ1 and κ2, of










Depending upon the parameter values, the eigenvalues are characterized in Lemma 3
below.
Lemma 3. The eigenvalues, κ1 and κ2, are characterized as follows:
• The value of κ1 is determined by the subjective discount factor and the parameter
values related to the factor intensity from the private perspective as follows:
– a1 − a2 < 0 if and only if κ1 > 1.
– 0 < eδ < a2/(a1 − a2) if and only if κ1 < −1.
– 0 < a2/(a1 − a2) < eδ if and only if −1 < κ1 < 0.
• The value of κ2 is determined by the parameter values related to the factor intensity
from the social perspective as follows:
– 0 < θ1 < 2θ2 if and only if −1 < κ2 < 1.
– 0 < 2θ2 < θ1 if and only if κ2 < −1.
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Proof: See the Appendix.
We obtain various results regarding the local stability of the steady state. In partic-
ular, we focus on the case in which the steady state is totally stable and indeterminacy
of equilibrium occurs so that we can consider self-fulfilling business fluctuations. It is
said that equilibrium is indeterminate if there exists a continuum of competitive equi-
librium. In particular, in this model, indeterminacy of equilibrium occurs if there exists
a continuum of initial prices of the consumption goods for any given initial capital, z0,
such that each one of them is consistent with a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 5. It holds that the steady state, (Ȳ , p̄), is totally stable, and thus, equilib-
rium is indeterminate around the steady state if and only if 0 < a2/(a1 − a2) < eδ and
0 < θ1 < 2θ2.
Proof: From Lemma 3, it follows that −1 < κ1 < 0 and −1 < κ2 < 1 if and only if
0 < a2/(a1 − a2) < eδ and 0 < θ1 < 2θ2. Therefore, the steady state, (Ȳ , p̄), is totally
stable if and only if 0 < a2/(a1 − a2) < eδ and 0 < θ1 < 2θ2. Since z0 is predetermined
and p0 can jump, if the steady state is totally stable, it follows that for any given initial
capital, z0, there exists a continuum of initial prices of the consumption goods, each one
of which together with z0 determines Y0 by Eq. (22) and produces a sequence {Yt, pt}∞t=0
in competitive equilibrium, and thus, equilibrium is indeterminate.
Proposition 5 implies that indeterminacy of equilibrium is more likely to occur when
the factor intensity is reversed between the private and social perspectives. The intu-
ition behind this appearance of the continuum of competitive equilibria when the factor
intensity is reversed is as follows. Suppose that θ2 > θ1 and a2 < a1, which satisfy the
condition for indeterminacy. Under this condition, the consumption sector is labor in-
tensive from the social perspective and the intermediate sector is labor intensive from the
private perspective. Consider a competitive equilibrium. To examine whether the neigh-
borhood of this competitive equilibrium can also be another competitive equilibrium,
suppose that the price of consumption goods pτ becomes infinitesimally greater than that
of the original competitive equilibrium in a certain period τ . Since the consumption sec-
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tor is labor intensive from the social perspective, the greater price of consumption goods
increases the wage rate and decreases the capital price (the Stolper-Samuelson prop-
erty). Accordingly, as noted from Eqs. (11) and (12), the capital-labor ratios in both
sectors must increase. Again, note from Eqs. (11) and (12) that since a2 < a1 and
e − a2 = b2 > b1 = e − a1, it must hold that z2t /l2t (the capital-labor ratio in the con-
sumption good sector) is greater than z1t /l
1
t (the capital-labor ratio in the intermediate
good sector) for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, the only way for both z2t /l2t and z1t /l1t to increase is
that both z2t and l
2




t increase. Then, in period τ + 1, output
in the consumption good sector decreases, whereas that in the intermediate good sector
increases. As a result, the price of consumption goods increases in period τ +1. Because
we have assumed the infinitesimal increase in the price of consumption goods in period
τ , this outcome is consistent with the dynamic equation of pt in Eq. (35), and thus, the
neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium can be another competitive equilibrium. In









t ≥ 0, and then, the only way for both z2t /l2t and z1t /l1t to increase is that both z2t and l2t
increase and both z1t and l
1
t decrease. Accordingly, the output in the consumption good
sector increases, whereas that in the intermediate good sector decreases in period τ +1.
As a result, the price of consumption goods decreases in period τ + 1. This outcome
contradicts the dynamic equation of pt in Eq. (35), and thus, the neighborhood of a
competitive equilibrium cannot be another competitive equilibrium.
5 Self-fulfilling business fluctuations
One notes from Lemma 3 that the stability of the steady state is independent of the
extent of financial constraints, as it is affected only by the private and social factor
intensities and the subjective discount factor. Although the extent of financial con-
straints does not affect the stability of the steady state, it would amplify endogenous
business fluctuations caused by extrinsic uncertainty. It is well known that indetermi-
nacy equilibrium in dynamic general equilibrium models is a potential cause of sunspot
17
fluctuations. Therefore, we focus on the case in which indeterminacy in equilibrium
arises, i.e., 0 < a2/(a1 − a2) < eδ and 0 < θ1 < 2θ2 as shown in Proposition 5.
Assumption 1. (i) 0 < θ1 < 2θ2 and (ii) 0 < a2/(a1 − a2) < eδ.
5.1 Sunspot variable
A sunspot variable, ϵt, is introduced in our model, which is assumed to follow a white
noise process with mean 0 and variance σ2 and to be independent and identically dis-
tributed across time. The support for ϵt is [−ϵ̄, ϵ̄], where ϵ̄ is assumed not to be too
large so that equilibrium with sunspots can exist. Each agent faces a common sunspot
variable in each period, and ϵt is independent of Φt′(ωt′) for all t ≥ 0 and t′ ≥ 0. The
history of sunspot events until period t is written as ϵt = {ϵ0, ϵ1, ..., ϵt}.
The sunspot variable, ϵt, is realized at the beginning of period t, and thus, each agent
makes a decision about consumption and saving given information about the history of










where E[.| ωt−1, ϵt] is the expectation operator given ωt−1 and ϵt. Although the cutoff,
ϕt, is no longer equal to rt+1/qt+1, the concrete expression of ϕt is unnecessary. This is
because from the financial market clearing condition, Proposition 1 still holds, and even-
tually, we obtain ϕt = ϕ
∗.8 Then, the individual return to saving, Rt+1 in equilibrium,
is given by
Rt+1(ωt) =
 rt+1 if Φt(ωt) ≤ ϕ
∗
q(pt+1)Φt(ωt)−rt+1µ
1−µ if Φt(ωt) > ϕ
∗,
(38)







∣∣∣∣ωt−1, ϵt] . (39)
8For reference, we can obtain ϕt = rt+1E[1/pt+1|ϵt]/E[q(pt+1)/pt+1|ϵt] when the agents are subject
to the sunspot variable.
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5.2 Sunspot fluctuations and financial development












One can verify that Eq. (40) can be obtained by taking the expectation for both sides









θ2 =: s(pt; ϵt+1). (42)
From (28) and (42), we obtain
Yt+1 = −
H(ϕ∗)q(s(pt; ϵt+1))
e(1− µ)(a1 − a2)
(a2Yt − w(pt)) +
w(s(pt; ϵt+1))
e
=: J(Yt, pt; ϵt+1). (43)
The linearization of (42) and (43) around the steady state with ϵt+1 = 0 leads to
 Yt+1 − Ȳ
pt+1 − p̄
 =





























(a1 − a2)(1− (1− θ1)eδ) + α1
a2 + eδ(a1 − a2)
)
.
The sunspot variable that affects the price of consumption goods, ϵt+1, has an impact
on the gross product. Formally, we have Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6. Given Yt and pt, the sunspot variable, ϵt+1, negatively affects the gross
product, Yt+1, in the neighborhood of the steady state, i.e., ∂Yt+1/∂ϵt+1 < 0.
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Proof: The claim follows from (44) because Θ > 0.
The sunspot variable, ϵt+1, has a negative impact on Yt+1 in both cases in which θ2 > θ1
and θ2 < θ1. In the case in which θ2 > θ1, the consumption good sector is more labor
intensive than the intermediate good sector from the social perspective. In this case,
if a positive extrinsic shock (ϵt+1 > 0) increases pt+1 in (42), the wage rate increases
and the capital price decreases (the Stolper-Samuelson property). The increase in the
wage rate has a positive effect on the gross product at time t+ 1 as seen in the second
term of the right-hand side of Eq. (43), whereas the decrease in the capital price has a
negative effect on the gross product, as seen in the first term of the right-hand side of
Eq. (43) because a2Yt − w(pt) is negative. The latter negative effect is always stronger
than the former positive effect. On the other hand, in the case in which θ2 < θ1, the
intermediate good sector is more labor-intensive than the consumption good sector from
the social perspective. Therefore, if an extrinsic shock (ϵt+1 > 0) increases 1/pt+1 in
(42), which is a relative price of the intermediate goods, the wage rate increases and the
capital price decreases (again, the Stolper-Samuelson property). As in the case in which
θ2 > θ1, the increase in the wage rate has a positive effect on the gross product, whereas
the decrease in the capital price has a negative effect on the gross product. Again, the
latter negative effect is always stronger than the former positive effect. In either case, a
positive extrinsic shock decreases the gross product.
With Yt and pt given, we obtain the variance of Yt+1 from Eq. (44) as follows:








H(ϕ∗)/(1 − µ) is an increasing function with respect to µ as proven in the proof of
Proposition 4. Therefore, whether financial development amplifies or contracts sunspot
fluctuations depends on the factor intensity from the social perspective.
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the following hold:
• ∂V (Yt+1)/∂µ > 0 if θ2 > 2θ1 − 1.
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• ∂V (Yt+1)/∂µ < 0 if θ2 < 2θ1 − 1.
Proof: H(ϕ∗)/(1−µ) is an increasing function with respect to µ. Therefore, the claims
follow from Eq. (45).
Fig. 1 shows the regions of θ1 and θ2 that represent whether the effect that the
sunspot variable has on the gross product is amplified or contracted. As seen in this fig-
ure, when the labor intensity in the consumption good sector from the social perspective
is very large, it is more likely that the effect of the sunspot variable is magnified, whereas
when the labor intensity in the intermediate good sector from the social perspective is
very large, it is more likely that the effect of the sunspot variable is contracted.
[Fig. 1 around here]
The sunspot variable, ϵt+1, that appears in (42) perturbs both Eqs. (42) and (43),
which are the dynamic equations with respect to pt and Yt, respectively. Our concern
was whether financial development amplifies sunspot fluctuations with the perturba-
tions being magnified. Proposition 7 implies that the answer to this question depends
on the factor intensities from the social perspective. As far as ϵt+1 is not so large,
the dynamic course of (Yt, pt) does not diverge for any initial consumption price, p0,
and any gross product, Y0 under Assumption 1. More precisely, (Yt, pt) converges to
the stationary state in the neighborhood of the steady state, (Ȳ , p̄), when the sunspot
variable is realized in each period. Given this situation, one should check whether the
dynamic behavior of (Yt, pt) around the steady state satisfies the transversality condition,
limτ→∞ δ
τE[at+τ (ω
t+τ−1, ϵt+τ )/pt+τ |ωt−1, ϵt] = 0, because the sunspot variable is extrap-




Does financial development amplify sunspot fluctuations? To answer this question, we
have investigated a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with sector-specific
production externalities and financial frictions. As the financial sector is well developed,
capital accumulation is promoted and the gross product in the steady state monotoni-
cally increases. On the other hand, if the consumption sector is less labor intensive from
the private perspective but more labor intensive from the social perspective relative to
the intermediate sector, it is more likely for indeterminacy of equilibria to occur. By
introducing a sunspot variable in this situation, we demonstrate that financial devel-
opment is more likely to amplify sunspot fluctuations when the labor intensity in the
consumption good sector from the social perspective is very large, whereas financial de-
velopment is more likely to contract sunspot fluctuations when the labor intensity in the
intermediate good sector from the social perspective is very large.
One possible direction in which to extend from the current model is to investigate
open economies with the basic setup remaining unchanged. Whether the results remain
the same if a small open economy or a large open economy is assumed is not obvious at
all because not only international trade but also financial trade across economies with
financial frictions must be taken into account. This question is left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1

























t−1)dP t(ωt−1)dP (ωt) = 0. (A.1)




























The last equation yields G(ϕt) = µ.
Proof of Lemma 1













× at−1(ωt−2)dP t(ωt−1) =: It
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We define Ξt−1 = {ωt−1 ∈ Ω|Φt−1(ωt−1) ≤ ϕt−1} as in the proof of Proposition 1. The




































































where the second equality of (B.2) is obtained because G(ϕt−1) = µ. Capital producers
invest xt−1(ω
t−1) = at−1(ω















t−1)dP t(ωt−1), (B.3) becomes
It = q(pt)zt. (46)
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t−2) + wt + πt − ptct(ωt−1)]dP t(ωt−1)
= q(pt)zt + wt +Πt − ptCt. (C.1)
From Eq. (8), we have F 1(l1t , z
1
t ) + ptF
2(l2t , z
2
t ) = q(pt)zt + wt + Πt. Additionally, from
the market clearing condition for consumption goods, it follows that ptF
2(l2t , z
2
t ) = ptCt.




t−1)dP t(ωt−1) = F 1(l1t , z
1
t ). (C.2)
Proof of Proposition 2
Capital is produced by agents who draw an individual-specific productivity, Φt(ωt),





























F 1(l1t , z
1
t ),
where Ξt = {ωt ∈ Ω|Φt(ωt) ≤ ϕt}, and H(ϕ∗) =
∫ h
ϕ∗




Proof of Proposition 3









































Proposition 1 is used to derive the last equality.
Proof of Proposition 4
















The claims follow from this equation, Eqs. (31), (32), and (33).
Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Regarding κ1, because δ ∈ (0, 1) and e ∈ (0, 1), it follows that eδa1 + (1 − eδ)a2 >
0 ⇐⇒ a2 > eδ(a2−a1). Therefore, it holds that a2−a1 > 0 ⇐⇒ κ1 = a2/[eδ(a2−a1)] >
1. Obviously, it holds that 0 < eδ < a2/(a1 − a2) ⇐⇒ κ1 < −1 and 0 < a2/(a1 − a2) <
eδ ⇐⇒ −1 < κ1 < 0. (ii) Regarding κ2, 0 < θ1 < 2θ2 ⇐⇒ −1 < κ2 < 1 and
0 < 2θ2 < θ1 ⇐⇒ κ2 < −1.
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Confirmation of the transversality condition

















θ1 [(Jp(Ȳ , p̄)(θ2−θ1)]/[θ1(κ1−
κ2)], D̃ = [H(ϕ
∗)/(1 − µ)]
θ2−θ1
θ1 [θ2 − θ1]/[θ1(κ1 − κ2)], Ỹt = Yt − Ȳ + [Jp(Ȳ , p̄)/(κ1 −
κ2)](pt − p̄), and p̃t = [1/(κ1 − κ2)](pt − p̄). Using (E.1), we obtain
Yt+τ = Ȳ + κ
τ






− Jp(Ȳ , p̄)D̃
τ∑
s=1





pt+τ = p̄+ κ
τ











From (13), (20), (22), (E.2), and (E.3), it follows that







Ȳ + κτ1(Yt − Ȳ ) +
κτ1−κτ2
























In (E.4), note that |κ1| < 1 and |κ2| < 1, and the support for ϵt+1 is a closed interval.
Therefore, F 1(L1t+τ , Z
1









∣∣∣ϵt] = 0 (E.5)
By applying Lemma 2 to (E.5), it follows that
δτE
[








To compute the right-hand side of (E.6), we define ωt+τ−1,t−1 = {ωt, ..., ωt+τ−1} ∈ Ωt+τ \

































∣∣∣ωt−1, ϵt] dP t(ωt−1). (E.7)











∣∣∣ωt−1, ϵt] dP t(ωt−1) = 0. (E.8)
The financial constraint implies that at+τ (ω
t+τ−1, ϵt+τ ) = bt+τ (ω
t+τ , ϵt+τ )+kt+τ (ω
t+τ , ϵt+τ ) >
bt+τ (ω
t+τ , ϵt+τ ) + µkt+τ (ω








∣∣∣ωt−1, ϵt] = 0.
This is the transversality condition for each agent.
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Fig. 1: The effect of financial development on the gross product variance.
Notes: In the variance-expanded region, the variance of the gross product
is expanded as 𝜇𝜇 increases, whereas in the variance-contracted region,
the variance of the gross product is contracted as 𝜇𝜇 increases.
